Mindfulness-induced selflessness: a MEG neurophenomenological study by Yair Dor-Ziderman et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 24 September 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00582
Mindfulness-induced selflessness: a MEG
neurophenomenological study
Yair Dor-Ziderman1*, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana2, Joseph Glicksohn1,3 and Abraham Goldstein1,4
1 The Leslie and Susan Gonda (Goldschmied) Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
2 Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
3 Department of Criminology, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
4 Department of Psychology, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Edited by:
Wendy Hasenkamp, Mind and Life
Institute, USA
Reviewed by:
Brenton W. McMenamin, University
of Maryland, USA
Norman Farb, Baycrest, Canada
*Correspondence:
Yair Dor-Ziderman, Electromagnetic
Brain Imaging Unit, The Leslie and
Susan Gonda (Goldschmied)
Multidisciplinary Brain Research
Center, Bar-Ilan University, Building
number 901, Ramat Gan 52900,
Israel
e-mail: yairem@gmail.com
Contemporary philosophical and neurocognitive studies of the self have dissociated two
distinct types of self-awareness: a “narrative” self-awareness (NS) weaving together
episodic memory, future planning and self-evaluation into a coherent self-narrative
and identity, and a “minimal” self-awareness (MS) focused on present momentary
experience and closely tied to the sense of agency and ownership. Long-term Buddhist
meditation practice aims at realization of a “selfless” mode of awareness (SL),
where identification with a static sense of self is replaced by identification with the
phenomenon of experiencing itself. NS-mediating mechanisms have been explored by
neuroimaging, mainly fMRI, implicating prefrontal midline structures, but MS processes
are not well characterized and SL even less so. To this end we tested 12 long-term
mindfulness meditators using a neurophenomenological study design, incorporating
both magnetoencephalogram (MEG) recordings and first person descriptions. We found
that (1) NS attenuation involves extensive frontal, and medial prefrontal gamma band
(60–80Hz) power decreases, consistent with fMRI and intracranial EEG findings; (2)
MS attenuation is related to beta-band (13–25Hz) power decreases in a network
that includes ventral medial prefrontal, medial posterior and lateral parietal regions;
and (3) the experience of selflessness is linked to attenuation of beta-band activity
in the right inferior parietal lobule. These results highlight the role of dissociable
frequency-dependent networks in supporting different modes of self-processing, and
the utility of combining phenomenology, mindfulness training and electrophysiological
neuroimaging for characterizing self-awareness.
Keywords: self-awareness, minimal self, narrative self, MEG, mindfulness meditation, neurophenomenology, beta
frequency band, right inferior parietal lobule
INTRODUCTION
An unremitting companion of human experience is the sense of
self. Amidst the ocean of coming-and-going waves of percep-
tions, cognitions and emotions, an absolute certainty regarding
the identity of the present-moment experiencer—“self as I”—
remains unwavering (James, 1890). On the other hand, the thread
of a constant, static, unchanging self—the “self as Me”—stretches
back to childhood years, and extends as far into the future as
one can imagine. The protagonist of both scenarios is experi-
enced as one-and-the-same, even though the respective (imag-
ined/remembered) bodies, mental capacities, as well as external
contexts have completely changed. These phenomenally distinct
aspects of self-awareness are being re-conceptualized by contem-
porary philosophers, psychologists and neurobiologists, aiming at
a fruitful exchange between philosophy of mind, phenomenology,
and the cognitive sciences. One such influential conceptualiza-
tion has been offered by Gallagher (2000) as “minimal” and
“narrative” forms of self-awareness.
The “minimal” self (MS) is defined as a consciousness
of oneself as the immediate subject of experience. It is
pre-reflective, present-centered, experiential in nature, and
importantly, involves a sense of “ownership” and “agency”: the
sense that it is I who is undergoing an experience (Gallagher,
2000). MS, or “core self” in Damasio’s (1999, 2010) terms, is
understood to be intermittent. Damasio describes it as “. . . a
transient entity, ceaselessly recreated for each and every object
with which the brain interacts” (Damasio, 1999, p. 17), in this
way implementing a self/non-self distinction and thus speci-
fying the self in perception, cognition, emotion, and action
(Christoff et al., 2011). The “narrative” self (NS), on the other
hand, refers to a self extended in time, heavily reliant on
language, episodic/autobiographical memory and imagination
(planned/expected future), and corresponding to identity and
personhood. The notion of NS has appeared in the literature
under other names such as the “extended” self and “concep-
tual” self (Neisser, 1988), the “autonoetic” self (Gardiner, 2001)
and the “autobiographical” self (Damasio, 1999, 2010), and has
been shown to be closely tied to a neurophysiological baseline
(Gusnard et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008), the so-called default-
mode network (DMN, Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al.,
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2001) and tomind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al.,
2009; Hasenkamp et al., 2012). It is important to note that NS
and MS are processes which may operate concurrently. Like other
conscious mental content produced by the brain, NS represen-
tations, perceived as thoughts and feelings, are stamped with the
subjective signature of being our thoughts and feelings. Thus, self-
specifying processes are at play also during NS (Gallagher, 2000;
Damasio, 2010).
Eastern philosophy, and in particular Buddhist philosophy,
exhibits a radically different view of the self and personal iden-
tity, advocating a “selfless” mode of processing phenomena (SL).
At the core of Buddhist psychology lies the teaching of there
being no such thing as a permanent, unchanging self (Dreyfus
and Thompson, 2007; Olendzki, 2010). The self is understood
to be illusory in the sense of being no more than a men-
tal process—and identification with it is understood to be at
the very root of suffering. Thus, a primary target of Buddhist
practice is the realization of the illusory nature of the self and
cultivation of a selfless, boundless mode of experience where
identification with a static sense of self is replaced by iden-
tification with the phenomenon of experiencing itself (Hart,
1987; Dalai Lama, 1991; Austin, 2000; Ekman et al., 2005;
Wallace, 2006; Nydahl, 2008). The notion of relinquishing the
sense of owning and directing experience, may seem to the
Western mind as nothing short of pathological (for a related
discussion, see Engler, 2003). And indeed, pathological brains
such as of schizophrenic patients experiencing “thought inser-
tion” (Frith, 1992; Gallagher, 2004) or patients who have suf-
fered lesions (Damasio et al., 2012; Philippi et al., 2012) com-
promising specific self functions, have largely contributed to
Damasio’s and Gallagher’s understanding of the minimal/core
self-concept. In a similar vein, as has been previously suggested
(Lutz et al., 2007; Tagini and Raffone, 2010), long-term mind-
fulness meditators can provide parallel information regarding
the self through diminishing the agentive/ownership aspects of
present-moment experience. Such information, however, has the
advantage of being volitionally produced and in non-diseased
brains.
The neurophysiology of NS is relatively well established. A
wealth of recent large-scale meta-analyses of mainly fMRI stud-
ies investigating self-referential processing through a variety of
paradigms have consistently shown it to be modulated by a sub-
set of the DMN, namely the central midline structures, and in
particular the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Northoff et al.,
2006, 2011; Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010;
Qin and Northoff, 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011; Kim,
2012). Translating these findings into electrophysiological terms,
there is accumulating evidence that the fMRI’s hemodynamic
response signal attributed to DMN and self-referential process-
ing is correlated with neuronal activity in the gamma band (EEG
studies—Mantini et al., 2007; Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012), and
in particular high-gamma band (intracranial EEG studies—Nir
et al., 2007; Jerbi et al., 2010; Ossandón et al., 2011; Ramot et al.,
2012). It should be noted that whether self-referential paradigms
can reveal neural activity specific to the self is a matter of cur-
rent debate, as these tasks involve, and are thus confounded by,
higher-order cognitive functions such as evaluation, judgment
and reflective thought (Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Christoff et al.,
2011; Northoff et al., 2011).
The neural correlates of MS are less well established, with
approaches aiming at identifying self-specifying pre/non–
reflective processes including merely perceiving, without
judgment or evaluation, self-specific vs. non-specific stimuli
(Schneider et al., 2008; Northoff et al., 2009), or improving
time resolution using event-related EEG (Esslen et al., 2008) or
MEG (Walla et al., 2007). Other approaches are informed by
phenomenology (Gallagher and Sørensen, 2006) and target MS
via one of its core attributes—the sense of agency and ownership
(for reviews see David et al., 2008; Sperduti et al., 2011). Key
regions here include the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and the
insula. Importantly, the literature does not supply information
regarding the oscillatory signature of these mostly fMRI findings.
Oscillatory power increases/decreases that occur in specific fre-
quency bands and within different cortical areas have been shown
to be functionally relevant in the brain (Singh, 2012). In partic-
ular, the different modes of self-awareness might not only involve
different brain topographies, but perhaps also different oscilla-
tory signatures. In this regard, MEG is an appealing research tool
as it has both an excellent temporal (and thus spectral) resolution,
and it allows for a reliable source reconstruction (relative to EEG)
with a reasonable spatial resolution (Hansen et al., 2010).
In line with the advent of producing SL experiences in the
lab, the participants employed in the present study are long-term
mindfulness meditation practitioners. Mindfulness is defined and
practiced as a non-judgmental awareness of bodily or mental
experiences arising in the present moment. Regardless of how
pleasant or unpleasant the arising experiences are, the medita-
tor trains not to cling to, nor to push them away, but rather
to treat them with acceptance, openness and curiosity, watching
them arise, play in the theater of the mind and finally dissolve
back into the space of the mind (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Mindfulness
is a current and widespread form of Buddhist practice (Williams
and Kabat-Zinn, 2011), and has been shown to enhance cognitive
functions such as attentional abilities, emotional regulation, exec-
utive functions and memory (Chiesa and Serretti, 2010; Chiesa
et al., 2011), altering the brain circuits and neuropsychological
mechanisms underlying these functions (Cahn and Polich, 2006;
Davidson and Lutz, 2008; Lutz et al., 2008; Hölzel et al., 2011b),
and even altering brain structure in regions typically activated
during mindfulness meditation (Lazar et al., 2005; Hölzel et al.,
2008, 2011a).
One of mindfulness’s mechanisms of action is an altered sense
of self (Hölzel et al., 2011b). Mindful awareness induces a sharper
sense of the normally perceived subjective sense of self (Lutz
et al., 2008), but treats it as an object of meditation. This culti-
vated shift to an “observer perspective” (Kerr et al., 2011) induces
a change in the perspective of self and first-person experience.
Indeed, a recent integrative theoretical framework and systems-
based neurobiological model suggests understandingmindfulness
by focusing on self-processing and the neural networks underly-
ing self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-transcendence (Vago
and Silbersweig, 2012). A growing number of studies show that
mindfulness alters DMN and self-related activity and connectiv-
ity (EEG: Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012; Lehmann et al., 2012;
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fMRI: Pagnoni et al., 2008; Brewer et al., 2011; Ives-Deliperi
et al., 2011; Froeliger et al., 2012; Hasenkamp and Barsalou, 2012;
Taylor et al., 2013). In particular, Farb et al. (2007) used fMRI
and a mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR, Kabat-Zinn,
1982; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992) intervention to dissociate narra-
tive from experiential modes of processing. The present study
continues Farb et al. (2007) in using mindfulness meditators for
revealing the neural correlates of momentary (parallel to MS)
and across-time (parallel to NS) self processing, but goes fur-
ther in exploring SL: momentary phenomenal experience free
of the sense of agency and ownership. Figure 1 illustrates the
encapsulated relationship between NS, MS and SL.
The working basis for the present study’s design is that long-
term mindfulness meditators: (1) are adept in keeping their
attention for extended time periods on an object of choice, be
it a physical object, the breath, or a produced state of self; and
(2) develop through practice their goal of dissolving the expe-
rience of a fixed subjective core comprising their self-identity.
Thus, such participants were recruited and requested to mentally
project states representingNS,MS, and SL, while their brain activ-
ity was recorded by MEG. The purpose of the study is to map the
differential neural activity related to NS and MS, as well as char-
acterize SL, a present-centered conscious experience devoid of
an experiencing subjective self. The study’s aims and hypotheses
are to:
1. Map the neural correlates of NS. Given that MS is at play also
duringNS, contrasting the two conditions is expected to reflect
NS attenuation, and is hypothesized to result in a reduction of
mPFC high-gamma oscillatory activity. This part of the study
is expected to bridge results from the prevalent fMRI imaging
literature and the present MEG methodology.
2. Map the neural correlates of MS. Given that both MS and
SL share a present-centered experiential aspect, differing only
FIGURE 1 | Working model of self-awareness modes. NS, MS and SL as
encapsulated processing modes.
in terms of the experiencer—the agency/ownership aspects
accompanying experience, contrasting MS and SL is expected
to reflect the neural correlates of MS attenuation. Here predic-
tions are less clear, nevertheless, the IPL and insula are likely
to play roles. Localizing this differential activation within the
frequency domain will be a novel contribution of the present
study.
3. Use first-person reports for grouping the MEG data and iden-
tifying the neural correlates of the subjective aspects of the
Buddhist-described “selfless” experience.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen experienced meditation practitioners were recruited for
the research project. Two participants’ data were discarded early
on in the experiment. The first due to complaints of tiredness and
lack of focus, and the second due to back pain (to the point of
stopping the MEG recording). In addition, in order to establish
a common frame of reference for the first-person descriptions,
as well as control for confounds that might result from differ-
ent sources of training, only participants practicing very similar
forms of meditation were included in the study. Thus, the data
of two further participants (Zen and non-dual practitioners, see
Lutz et al., 2007 for details on these forms of meditation) were not
analyzed. The remaining 12 practitioners, all mindfulness med-
itators practicing similar forms of Vipassana, either originating
from or inspired by the Buddhist Theravada tradition, comprise
the participants of the present study. All are right-handed (9
males and 3 females, mean age 45.2, SD = 11.3, ranging from
31 to 66) with no history of mental or neurological disease. All
of the participants are long-term practitioners with an average of
16.5 (SD = 7.9, ranging from 9 to 34) years of meditation prac-
tice, and an average of 11,225 (SD = 9909, ranging from 1290
to 29,293) total hours of meditation practice. All the performed
procedures are in compliance with the Code of Ethics of the
World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki), and were
approved by the Research Ethics Board of Bar-Ilan University.
The participants gave their written consent and were financially
compensated for their time.
PRE-RECORDING PROCEDURES
The participants were welcomed and introduced to the experi-
ment and the research facility. They then filled out forms noting
their agreement to participate in the experiment, their personal
details, and a form estimating their formal meditation experience.
Pre-task procedures included an average of 45min of clarifying
the study’s setup, tasks and stimuli using a PowerPoint presenta-
tion and allowing time for questions and discussion. In this way,
misunderstanding, alteration, or rejection of the scripts provided
by the researchers, were minimized (Roepstorff, 2001).
TASKS
The experiment included seven experimental sessions. Of these,
only the “self” session (fifth in order) is reported here. Each ses-
sion consisted of performing tasks during which the participant’s
brain activity was recorded. This was followed by an interview
conducted via the intercom system, during which brain activity
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 582 | 3
Dor-Ziderman et al. Mindfulness-induced selflessness
was not recorded. The participants were encouraged to stretch
their limbs and relax during the interview, but were requested
not to move and to keep their eyes closed while performing the
tasks. To correct for head and body movements during the inter-
view session, head-shapes were re-registered at the beginning
of each session. A 20-min break was suggested to the partici-
pants after completing the 5th session of the experiment, during
which refreshments were offered. Total time in the MEG ranged
from 2 to 3 h. The participants’ condition was closely monitored
throughout the experiment via the intercom (during the inter-
view sessions) and the closed-circuit TV camera (at all times). In
addition, participants were asked a number of times throughout
the experiment if they were tired and needed an additional break.
The task relevant to the present study is the “self task.”
Participants were requested to mentally project themselves into
certain self-related states, which had been described and discussed
during the PowerPoint presentation. The session included 3 con-
ditions, each repeated 3 times in succession for 30 s. This more
ecologically-valid design (in contrast to the commonly employed
event-related designs) was chosen due to mediators’ heightened
capacities in directing and sustaining attention (Brefczynski-
Lewis et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008). The first 4 s of each 30-s
epoch were omitted so as to allow participants sufficient time to
enter the states (SL in particular). This decision was made after
consulting a well-known, very-long-term, meditation teacher,
concerning the study design, and after 2 pilot runs (with two
of the authors, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana and Yair Dor-Ziderman,
who are also long-term meditators). A recording with instruc-
tions for each condition was sounded, after which the participant
performed the requested task. At the end of the 30 s, a sound was
heard indicating to the participant to stop and rate task perfor-
mance success (on a 1–3 scale). This measure was incorporated in
order to allow post-hoc identification of bad trials (button press
of 1). However, as none of the participants in any of the condi-
tions reported here indicated such bad trials, this measure was
not further used. After pressing the corresponding button, the
next instruction was delivered. The session was followed by a
structured interview conducted via the intercom system.
The exact instructions for each self-projected condition were:
i “narrative” condition (NS)—“Try to think what characterizes
you.”
ii “minimal” condition (MS)—“Try to experience what is hap-
pening to you at the present moment.”
iii “selfless” condition (SL)—“Try to experience what is happening
at the present moment, when you are not in the center.”
DATA ACQUISITION
MEG
MEG recordings were conducted with a whole-head, 248-channel
magnetometer array (4-D Neuroimaging, Magnes 3600WH) in
a magnetically-shielded room. Reference coils located approxi-
mately 30 cm above the head oriented by the x, y, and z axes were
used to remove environmental noise. Head position was indi-
cated by attaching 5 coils to the scalp and determining, to a 1mm
resolution, their position relative to the sensor array before and
after measurement. Head localization was performed before and
after each set of tasks to determine degree of head movement.
Head shape and coil position were digitized using a Pollhemus
FASTTRAK digitizer. Brain signals were recorded with a sample
rate of 1017.25Hz and an analog online 0.1–400Hz band-pass
filter. The instructions for each condition were presented using
E-prime 1.0 and delivered via a STAX SRS-005 amplifier and
SR-003 push-pull electrostatic ear speakers coupled by a vinyl
tube to silicon earpieces to prevent magnetic noise within the
shielded room. Task performance ratings were collected using a
LUMItouch photon control response box.
Subjective reports
Retrospective reports. Participants were asked to provide retro-
spective reports regarding their perceived (relative to past experi-
ences) success and stability (on a 1–10 scale, with 1 denoting “very
low” and 10 denoting “very high”) in performing the tasks, as well
as report on the emotional content of their experiences during the
different tasks.
Introspective reports. Participants were asked to describe their
SL experience freely and in their own words, without reflection
or judgment (Jack and Roepstorff, 2002; Schooler, 2002; Lutz
and Thompson, 2003). In addition, the descriptions were col-
lected immediately after they were produced in order to minimize
reliance on episodic recall (Jack and Roepstorff, 2002).
MEG DATA ANALYSIS
Cleaning and preprocessing
Data processing and analysis was performed using Matlab®
R2009b and FieldTrip toolbox for MEG analysis (Open Source
Software for Advanced Analysis of MEG, Oostenveld et al., 2011).
Data were cleaned for line frequency (by recording on an addi-
tional channel the 50Hz from the power outlet, and subtracting
the average power-line response from every MEG sensor), and
24Hz building vibration (measured in x, y, and z directions using
3 Bruel and Kjaer accelerometers) artifacts (Tal and Abeles, 2013).
The data from the 3 “self” tasks were then segmented into non-
overlapping 2-s epochs. Each epoch was visually examined for
muscle and jump (in the MEG sensors) artifacts. Contaminated
epochs were discarded. No malfunctioning MEG sensors were
identified. To ensure the removal of all heartbeat, eye, and muscle
artifact, an independent component analysis (ICA) was per-
formed on the data (Jung et al., 2000). Segmented data were
down-sampled to 339 (1017/3) Hz to speed up data decompo-
sition. The data were then decomposed into a set of independent
components (248, as the number of sensors) ordered by degree
of their explained variance. Components indicating heartbeats
or eye movements were determined from a visual inspection of
the 2D scalp maps and time course of each component. 2.6 ±
1.2 components were taken out on average, and the remaining
components were then used to reconstruct the pre down-sampled
data.
Sensor-level analyses
In order to level the number of trials for all participants and
conditions, the first 32 of the remaining epochs were marked
as the data for further sensor-level analyses. The segmented 2-s
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epochs were multiplied by a Hanning taper, and subjected to a
Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) for the frequencies ranging
from 0.5 to 100Hz. This resulted in a power spectrum with a
frequency resolution of 0.5Hz for each epoch. The power spec-
tra were then averaged across the epochs of each condition, thus
obtaining the mean power for each condition and participant.
The next step involved calculating, for each frequency of each sen-
sor of each participant, a power percent-in-signal-change (PSC)
metric, for estimating power differences in NS vs. MS and MS vs.
SL. PSC was computed in the following manner: for sensor S, fre-
quency f, and power values of conditions A and B, PSC[S(f )] =
[(A/B) − 1] if A >= B, and [1-(B/A)] if B > A. This manipula-
tion yields a balanced PSC distribution centered on 0. Each par-
ticipant’s PSC values for the two comparisons were then collapsed
across all sensors, and averaged across the delta (0.5–3.5Hz),
theta (4–7.5Hz), alpha (8–12.5Hz), beta (13–25Hz), gamma
(25.5–59.5Hz), high-gamma (60–80Hz), and very-high-gamma
(80.5–100Hz) frequency bands. To reduce dimensionality prior
to localization, 1-sample t-tests were performed for each fre-
quency band and for each comparison against the null hypothesis
that the PSC measures came from a continuous, normal distribu-
tion with a zero mean. Results were then Bonferroni-corrected.
Finally, 2D scalp topographies of the mean PSC in the significant
frequency bands and comparisons were created.
Source-space projection
Localization was performed for the frequency bands which evi-
denced significant PSC in the sensor-level data. Sources were esti-
mated using Synthetic Aperture Magnetometry (SAM, Robinson
and Vrba, 1999). SAM is an adaptive nonlinear minimum-
variance beamformer algorithm. It calculates the signal covari-
ance from the MEG sensor data and uses it in conjunction with a
forward solution for the dipoles at each 3D brain voxel (of a speci-
fied size) to construct optimum spatial filters. The spatial filtering
suppresses interference of unwanted signals from other locations.
For source estimation, the pre-ICA data were used. A number
of works have shown that interfering biomagnetic sources such
as cardiac, respiratory, and eye movements are effectively sup-
pressed by beamforming (e.g., Sekihara et al., 2006; Brookes et al.,
2008, 2011). Data were band filtered (using the SAM default IIR
filter) for each participant and condition in the frequency bands
specified through the sensor-level analysis. Covariance matrices,
and subsequently SAM weights, were computed for each 5 cubic-
mm voxel using the data from the two conditions participating in
each signal change calculation, for each frequency-band-filtered
time-series data. For each voxel, the data were multiplied by the
weights, thus creating “virtual sensor” time-series, which were
then transformed via FFT to the frequency domain, thus deriv-
ing power values. Finally, PSC values (same metric as the one
described in the sensor-level analysis section, pseudo-F in SAM)
were computed for each comparison, participant and each and
every voxel.
To facilitate group analysis, head models were constructed
by co-registering each participant’s SAM volume to a previously
obtained MRI scan (T1-weighted anatomical images acquired
with high-resolution 1-mm slice thickness, obtained by one of
the authors (Aviva Berkovich-Ohana) by means of a 3T Trio
Magnetom Siemens scanner located at the Weizmann Institute of
Science, Rehovot, Israel) based on the position of the fiduciary
markers established during the digitization phase. Each partici-
pant’s MRI image and its co-registered SAM volume were then
transposed into a common anatomical space (Talairach coordi-
nates, Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). Voxel-level group statistics,
for each comparison and frequency band, were conducted using
a non-parametric permutation analysis procedure (2000 per-
mutations, Nichols and Holmes, 2001; Singh et al., 2003), and
corrected for multiple comparisons based on a Monte Carlo sim-
ulation of random noise distribution (using AFNI’s 3dClustSim
module, Forman et al., 1995).
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
Subjective reports
Success and stability. For assessing whether participants’ ratings
for perceived success and stability were different for the different
tasks, repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for success and
stability as dependent variables.
Emotional content. Participant reports of emotional content
during each task were collected and arranged in 4 categories:
neutral—here participants either reported no emotional content
or explicitly stated a neutral state; positive—here participants
reported only positive emotions (such as enjoyment, comfort,
quiet, pleasant, rest, and lightness); negative—here participants
reported only negative emotions (such as pride, fear, anxiety,
confusion, insecurity, and dislike), and mixed—which included
reports of both positive and negative emotions. In addition, a
number of participants spontaneously reported low level of emo-
tions (NS—4 participants, 2 in the negative category and 2 in the
mixed category; SL—1 participant in the mixed category). A note
regarding the categorization of “pride” as a negative emotion:
this is in alignment with the Buddhist context (Goleman, 1995;
Chambers et al., 2009), given that the participants are long-term
practitioners of Buddhist traditions.
Meditation experience. Meditation experience was gauged using
a normalized measure incorporating both total number of years
and hours of meditation. The maximum values of meditation
year and hour estimates were extracted, and all other values were
divided by them, resulting in values between 0 and 1. The two
metrics were then averaged, giving equal weight to meditation
years and hours.
First-person SL descriptions. A careful reading by the authors of
the participants’ first-person descriptions of their SL experiences
indicated three rather broad but distinct types of experiences.
Age was ruled out as a confounding factor [ANOVA, F(1, 11) =
3.76, ns]. The suggested categorization was further validated by
presenting the raw participant descriptions and category expla-
nations (as presented below but without the examples) to 12
naïve referees (graduate students and postdoctoral researchers),
and asking them to categorize the descriptions according to the
suggested scheme. Descriptions which were categorized differ-
ently than the suggested scheme by more than one referee were
excluded from the analysis. Two descriptions were thus removed
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(sub14 and sub16’s, 4 referees categorized each of them differ-
ently), resulting in 10 SL descriptions. The participants’ descrip-
tions (including those finally excluded from the analysis) and
their categorization are presented below in Table 1. The suggested
categories are:
a. Lack-of-ownership (LO): The 4 participants in this category
reported experiencing what was happening, only with the
sense of agency/ownership absent. As an example, participant
sub12 described: “It was emptiness, as if the self fell out of the
picture. There was an experience but it had no address, it was not
attached to a center or subject . . . ”
b. Altered-experience (AE): The 4 participants in this category
reported an altered experience of their bodies/senses/spatial-
context. For example, sub11 reported: “On the level of feeling
and sensing—as if I took a step back and am looking at myself
from the back. I see myself but am also aware of what is
happening around . . . ”
c. Less-happening (LH): The grouping of this category was
somewhat looser than the other categories. The 4 partici-
pants in this category reported a quieting or general relaxation
of body, reflectivity, cognition, or experience in general. For
example, participant sub6 reported: “Very pleasant and relaxed
and quiet. It was the most devoid of effort relative to the previous
one . . . ”
MEG source estimates
To identify within the MS vs. SL beta-band (the only frequency
band relevant for characterizing SL—see results section) network
regions specifically correlated with the phenomenological cate-
gories, MEG source estimates of each phenomenological category
(vs. the other two categories) were derived in a manner similar
to the one described above. Group statistics, limited to the net-
work of interest (significant MS vs. SL beta band regions), were
computed on the Talairach-transformed individual images using
non-parametric random permutations with a 2-sample t-test
statistic.
RESULTS
SUBJECTIVE REPORTS
The first-person reports indicated that the participants were able
to successfully produce the different self-states. Themeans for task
success were high (on a 1–10 scale with 1 denoting “very low” and
10 denoting “very high”) for the NS, MS, and SL tasks (8.6 ± 0.9,
7.8 ± 1.4, and 8 ± 1.2, respectively). In addition, participants
reported high measures of task stability: 8.2 ± 1.6, 8 ± 1.4, and
7.6 ± 1.5 for NS, MS, and SL, respectively. These indicate that the
participants managed—in their subjective experience—to pro-
duce and maintain the requested self-states in a stable manner
for the task duration. The ANOVA indicated no significant dif-
ferences between the states for both task success [F(2, 11) = 2.2,
Table 1 | SL descriptions and their phenomenological categorization.
Phenomenal categories during SL
Lack-of-ownership (LO) Altered-experience (AE) Less-happening (LH)
Sub4: “The question was ‘what was
happening?’ As a sort of subjectivity focus,
which was softened and dissolved. And all that
was left was what was happening not to me.”
Sub5: “Like in a dream. Like I’m not awake
now but dreaming. Sensations of all kinds of
things flickering. . . A sort of meditative
phenomena and flickering of light and
darkness—difficult to describe in words. Like
colored dots on black. Wide and open,
something was liberated.”
Sub1: “. . . felt that less was happening, or that
not much was happening.”
Sub9: “. . . I understood that it was just a
sensation, it was not the hand itself, and the
sensation was liberated, and so on in other
areas. There were jumps of liberation; there
was a deep thought that all this was not mine.”
Sub8: “Floating above the entrance door,
between the room and the lab. . . ”
Sub2: “. . . less judgmental element; less
naming of the experience, less verbally.
Technique was something like ‘what is
happening to you right now’ task, but more
relaxed.”
Sub12: “It was emptiness, as if the self fell out
of the picture. There was an experience but it
had no address, it was not attached to a center
or subject. It was not 100%, but there was no
sense of an object there running the show.
Emptiness is the best word.”
Sub11: “. . . as if I took a step back and am
looking at myself from the back. I see myself
but am also aware of what is happening
around. . . ”
Sub6: “Very pleasant and relaxed and quiet. It
was the most devoid of effort relative to the
previous ones. Resting within the experience
and presence, easy and pleasant. . . ”
Sub14: “It was to be aware of the body, the
sensations, pulse, location of limbs, sounds
and sights—to be only a witness to all this.”
EXCLUDED FROM THE ANALYSIS
Sub16: “I rested within the body, and from the
perspective of how I perceive myself as NA I
kind of lost that. It was like being within a
space that is a space in distinction to
something with sides and a center.”
EXCLUDED FROM THE ANALYSIS
Sub14: “. . . There was a feeling of a shift in
alertness, a cessation of reflectivity. A different
kind of quiet. The language changed.”
Participants’ first-person SL experiences descriptions arranged by the suggested categorization scheme. Left column = LO category; middle column = AE category;
right column = LH category. Descriptions excluded from the analysis due to the validation process are so noted.
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MSE = 1.58, ns] and task stability [F(2, 11) = 1.08, MSE = 1.39,
ns]. These results help rule out attribution of between-conditions
differences to task difficulty.
The emotional content reported by the participants did dif-
fer between conditions. The emotional profiles during each of
the tasks are depicted in Figure 2. A marked difference can be
observed between the NS and the other two self-tasks. While in
the NS condition 10 participants reported negative (5) or mixed
(5) emotions, in the MS and SL conditions only one participant
reported negative or mixed emotions, and on the other hand,
8 (SL) and 9 (MS) reported a neutral affective state, while the
remaining 3 and 2 (respectively) participants reported positive
emotions.
SENSOR-LEVEL RESULTS
Of the frequency bands tested (delta, theta, alpha, beta,
gamma, high-gamma, very-high-gamma), the sensor level results
indicated a significant decrease in global (all 248 sensors)
PSC between the NS and MS conditions only in the high
gamma 60–80Hz band (mean PSC = −0.052 ± 0.0472; p <
0.02, 1-sample t-test, Bonferroni-corrected). In contrast, the only
frequency band evidencing a significant PSC when contrasting
the MS and SL conditions was the 13–25Hz beta band (mean
PSC = −0.103 ± 0.1107; p < 0.05, 1-sample t-test, Bonferroni-
corrected). The other frequency bands evidenced no significant
power PSC differences—even prior to the Bonferroni correction.
Figure 3 provides 2D topographic representations of the sensor
level power PSC in these two significant frequency bands. Note
the different topography for the two comparisons, with the high-
gamma NS vs. MS decreases in power occurring predominantly
over frontal-left electrodes and the beta MS vs. SL decreases being
more central and right lateralized.
SOURCE LOCALIZATION ESTIMATES
SAM beamforming source estimates are reported for the
60–80Hz high-gamma band for NS vs. MS, and in the 13–25Hz
FIGURE 2 | Emotional content during NS, MS, and SL. Distribution of
emotional content among participants (x-axis) during NS, MS, and SL
(y -axis). Note the marked difference between NS and other 2 conditions
regarding negative and mixed vs. neutral emotions.
beta band for MS vs. SL—as indicated by the sensor-level data.
As a comparative measure, the complementing high-gamma (for
MS vs. SL) and beta (for NS vs. MS) localization solutions are also
reported.
NS vs. MS source estimates
Resulting NS vs. MS 60–80Hz high-gamma band images were
thresholded at the maximum t-value possible for a non-
parametric random permutation analysis with 2000 permuta-
tions (t = 4.863, see methods section for details), yielding 2
robust (p < 0.0005, corrected) rather large clusters (314 and
264 voxels) spanning almost exclusively frontal regions, and all
indicating decreases in gamma power in MS relative to NS
(reflecting NS attenuation, see introduction). The larger cluster
(mean PSC −0.083, A1 and A2 in Figure 4) was more poste-
rior, including right and left precentral gyrus, middle cingulate
cortex, middle frontal gyrus and thalamic regions. In the right
hemisphere, the cluster included the posterior part of the infe-
rior frontal gyrus and operculum, lentiform nucleus and caudate
body. Two thirds of the cluster was in the right hemisphere; how-
ever, the left hemisphere PSC was stronger. The second cluster
(264 voxels, mean PSC −0.086, B1 and B2 in Figure 4), was more
anterior (prefrontal) and mostly left-lateralized (76%). The clus-
ter spanned bilateral dorsal and anterior regions of the medial
frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, and dorsal ACC. More
ventrally, left-lateralized regions included subgenual ACC, mid
orbital gyrus, middle frontal gyrus and middle cingulate cortex.
See Figure 4 and Table 2 for more details and a visual depiction.
In the beta band (13–25Hz), the NS vs. MS contrast also
resulted in significant PSC results, albeit markedly less robust
compared to the gamma band results and solely in posterior
regions. These images were thresholded at t = 3.887, yielding
3 significant clusters at the p < 0.0025 (corrected) level. Right-
hemisphere regions included mainly the fusiform and middle
temporal gyrus (48 voxels, mean PSC −0.148, C1 in Figure 4),
and a small cluster in the right cerebellum (8 voxels, mean
PSC -0.141, not shown). Left-hemisphere regions encompassed
mainly the middle occipital and lingual gyrus (36 voxels, mean
PSC −0.099, C2 in Figure 4). See Figure 4 and Table 2 for more
detail and visual depiction.
FIGURE 3 | 2D scalp maps of frequency bands with significant power
PSC. 2D topographic representations of significant sensor-level power PSC
for the NS vs. MS high-gamma 60–80Hz (left), and MS vs. SL beta
13–25Hz (right). Dots on the map represent sensors; color bar scale
indicates PSC from 0.2 (dark red) to −0.2 (dark blue).
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FIGURE 4 | NS vs. MS beamforming source estimates in the gamma
(60–80Hz) and beta (13–25Hz) frequency bands. Axial, sagittal, and
coronal views (left to right) of group (n = 12) PSC source estimates
overlayed on the Colin template. Note that in all images right and left sides
are crossed. Color bar indicates PSC degree. Gamma band clusters: Cluster
A is presented in 2 views. Crosshairs in (A1) are on the right medial
anterior cingulate, and in (A2) on the left thalamus. Cluster B is presented
in 2 views. Crosshairs in (B1) are on the left anterior cingulate, and in (B2)
on the right anterior medial prefrontal cortex. Beta band clusters:
Crosshairs in (C1) are on the right fusiform gyrus, and in (C2) on the left
middle occipital gyrus.
MS vs. SL source estimates
Resulting MS vs. SL 13–25Hz beta band source estimates were
thresholded at t = 3.887, yielding six clusters (for a total of
390 voxels) significant at p < 0.0025 (corrected), all indicating
decreased beta power in SL relative to MS (reflecting MS attenu-
ation, see introduction). No significant clusters were found in the
high-gamma band range. The largest cluster (182 voxels, mean
PSC −0.067, A1 and A2 in Figure 5) consisted of prefrontal and
left lateralized regions including the superior frontal gyrus, ven-
tral mPFC, and rostral ACC; bilateral regions including the sub-
genual ACC, mid orbital, and rectal gyrus; and a region located in
the right middle frontal gyrus. The 2nd cluster (109 voxels, mean
PSC −0.08, B in Figure 5) was completely in the right hemi-
sphere and included regions from the postcentral gyrus, middle
cingulate cortex, paracentral lobule, precuneus, and posterior cin-
gulate cortex (PCC), and the IPL. The 3rd cluster (66 voxels, mean
PSC−0.072,C in Figure 5) included large portions of the left tha-
lamus and lentiform nucleus, extending medially to the left pos-
terior insula. The 4th cluster (13 voxels, −0.1 PSC,D in Figure 5)
was more anterior and lateral compared to the 2nd cluster, and
included regions of the right IPL and postcentral gyrus. The 5th
cluster (11 voxels, −0.081 PSC, D in Figure 5) was located in the
left IPL, and the 6th cluster (9 voxels, −0.105 PSC, not shown)
in the right precentral gyrus and the posterior middle frontal
gyrus. See Figure 5 and Table 3 for more details and a visual
depiction.
NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY
The neurophenomenological data consisted of the participants’
first-person descriptions of their SL experiences, and the MS vs.
SL beta-band network described above. The phenomenal cate-
gorization yielded three categories (LO, AE, and LH, as detailed
in the methods section). The LO category participants were also
the most experienced and formed a distinct group with med-
itation experience being qualitatively higher than the members
of the other categories (see Figure 6). The other two experience
categories were mixed in terms of their members’ meditative
experience.
Source estimates characterizing each phenomenal category
were obtained by pitting the beta-band MS vs. SL images of the
participants in each phenomenological category against the other
two categories. Two significant cluster were found, distinguishing
LO participants (n = 4) from the others (n = 6, not including
“unclear” category). The first cluster was located in the right
IPL and the second in the left dorsomedial thalamus. The other
phenomenological categories did not yield any significant clus-
ters. In addition, the same analysis but within the gamma-band
NS vs. MS images yielded no significant source estimates for
any of the phenomenal categories. Thus, methodological trian-
gulation (Gallagher, 2002; Jack and Roepstorff, 2002) of distinct
phenomenology, meditative expertise and SAM source estimates
in the beta band, culminated in a distinct neurophenomeno-
logical characterization of the LO category. Visual depictions
of these regions, along with cluster details are presented in
Figure 7.
ISSUES OF VALIDITY
Myogenic artifact
As participants reported a more neutral emotional state dur-
ing MS relative to NS, it might be argued that the reported
decrease in high-gamma power (in which myogenic artifacts
may manifest) reflects a more relaxed state and thus reduced
muscle-activity, and not a difference in neural activity. There are,
however, a number of arguments that make this unlikely: (1)
Muscle artifacts are less of a problem in MEG relative to EEG
measurements, partly due to the possibility of reliably localiz-
ing the effects’ activation locus. In fact, MEG has been previ-
ously employed for determining whether EEG high frequency
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Table 2 | NS vs. MS beamforming solutions for gamma (60–80Hz) and beta (13–25Hz).
Condition Cluster #
(number of
voxels)
Threshold
(t-value)
Peak voxel (sig change) Hemisphere
overlap
Regions included in cluster
(atlas TT_Daemon)
TLRC coordinates (mm, RAI) PSC t-value
x y z Left (%) Right (%) Name Overlap (%)
N
S
vs
.M
S
(6
0–
80
H
z)
1 (314) 4.86** 37.5 7.5 37.5 −0.148 4.86 32.40 65.10 L/R Cingulate gyrus 22.0
L/R Precentral gyrus 20.0
L/R Middle frontal gyrus 11.3
L/R Thalamus 7.5
R Inferior frontal gyrus 3.7
R Lentiform nucleus 2.8
R Postcentral gyrus 1.4
R Caudate 1.2
R Insula 0.9
2 (262) 4.86** 2.5 −42.5 −2.5 −0.108 4.86 76.00 23.1 L/R Medial frontal gyrus 36.5
L/R Anterior cingulate 21.3
L/R Superior frontal gyrus 15.1
L/R Cingulate gyrus 5.6
L Middle frontal gyrus 1.0
N
S
vs
.M
S
(1
3–
25
H
z)
1 (48) 3.89* −42.5 57.5 −12.5 −0.189 4.02 0.00 99.60 R Fusiform gyrus 31.0
R Middle temporal gyrus 13.9
R Inferior temporal gyrus 6.0
R Declive 4.8
R Parahippocampal gyrus 3.7
2 (46) 3.89* 32.5 67.5 −2.5 −0.122 4.61 100.00 0.00 L Middle occipital gyrus 26.2
L Lingual gyrus 7.1
L Middle temporal gyrus 5.4
L Posterior cingulate 3.9
L Inferior temporal gyrus 2.7
L Inferior occipital gyrus 2.2
3 (8) 3.89* −32.5 72.5 −32.5 −0.146 3.95 0.00 100.00 R Pyramis 62.4
R Tuber 28.5
Information supplied includes number of voxels in each cluster, thresholds, peak voxel characteristics, hemispheric overlap, and brain regions included in the cluster.
The Afni supplied TT Daemon atlas was used. Due to poor resolution and signal leakage to non-brain regions, overlap percentages do not always add up to 100%.
*p < 0.0025; **p < 0.0005 (corrected).
components may have a muscular origin (Zimmermann and
Scharein, 2004; Claus et al., 2012). (2) Pre-emptive measures
were taken to counter muscle artifacts during both data collec-
tion (supine positioning, eyes closed) and data cleaning (visual
inspection of all the data). (3) The high-gamma effect found
here is dissimilar to typical myogenic artifacts (described in
Muthukumaraswamy, 2013) in several ways. The effect, on the
sensor level is: (a) highly lateralized (and it is unlikely that for
all the participants the artifact was confined to one hemisphere);
(b) does not extend to the montage borders (which is the nor-
mal case for muscle artifacts); and (c) the activity is narrowly
confined to the 60–80Hz band (while myogenic artifacts tend to
be “patchy” and to command a wider spectrum). (4) Finally, the
reported regions are consistent with a well-established body of
literature.
In addition, in order to empirically test the link between
increased emotionality, the myogenic artifact and increased
high-gamma PSC, a further analysis was conducted. The values
of the peak activation voxels of each of the two NS vs. MS clus-
ters (reported in Table 2), were extracted for each participant (by
transposing the group Talairach coordinates back to each partici-
pant’s MRI image and its co-registered SAM volume). Then, these
values (for each voxel) were sorted into two groups: participants
who spontaneously reported little or no emotions (4 and 1 partic-
ipants, respectively) during NS, and participants who did not (7
participants). There were no significant differences between the
groups for both tested voxels (2-sample t-test, ns), with the PSC
means of the decreased emotionality group being actually higher
than the normal group (contrary to what could be expected if the
tested hypothesis was correct).
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FIGURE 5 | MS vs. SL beamforming source estimates in the beta
(13–25Hz) band. Axial, sagittal, and coronal views (left to right) of
group (N = 12) SAM pseudo-F source estimates overlayed on the
Colin template. Note that in all images right and left sides are
crossed. Color bar indicates PSC degree. Cluster A reveals prefrontal
deactivations in two views: the crosshairs in (A1) are on the left
anterior medial prefrontal gyrus, and in (A2) on the right subgenual
anterior cingulate. Cluster (B) shows deactivation in the posterior
medial cortex, with the crosshairs pinpointing the right precuneus.
Cluster (C) shows deactivation in the left thalamus; and clusters (D)
and (E) deactivations in the right and left inferior parietal lobules,
respectively.
Attentional demands
To rule out confounds resulting from attentional demands being
different for the different tasks, we ran some additional analyses
(on top of the subjective ratings of task success which evidenced
no significant differences). The bulk of the meditation-related
literature (see Cahn and Polich, 2006 for an extensive review)
reports changes in anterior and posterior alpha and/or mid-line
theta oscillatory activity as measures gauging the concentrative
attention-related aspects of meditation. Thus, we checked (using
a robust, cluster-based non-parametric permutations approach,
Maris and Oostenveld, 2007) whether any significant clusters in
these frequency bands could be identified. None where found.
In addition, activity in the dorsolateral PFC has been specifically
found to reflect task difficulty, in particular regarding long-
term meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). The fact that
the present results showed no sign of dorsolateral PFC activity
changes between the conditions can be taken as yet another indi-
cation that attentional demands do not account for the reported
results.
DISCUSSION
In summarizing the findings of the present study, three main
points emerge: (1) NS attenuation is characterized by decreases
in high-gamma (60–80Hz) oscillatory activity. These are left-
hemisphere-dominated and manifest in frontal, thalamic and
extensive dorsal and ventral mPFC regions, in line with the
related fMRI literature; (2) MS attenuation is characterized by
decreases in beta-band (13–25Hz) oscillatory activity in both
overlapping (with the gamma network) regions including the
left ventral mPFC and thalamus, and a right pre-motor region,
and non-overlapping regions including the right PCC and pre-
cuneus medially, and bilateral but right-hemisphere dominated
IPL. While these regions have been previously tied to MS pro-
cessing, the frequency band hosting these deactivations—the beta
band—is a novel finding of the present study; (3) Phenomenal
characterization of participants’ descriptions of their SL experi-
ences yielded three distinct categories of experience. In particular,
the LO group, whose experiences indicated a sharp attenuation
of the sense of agency/ownership, and who were also distinct in
terms of their greater meditative expertise, also evidenced a dis-
tinct neural signature characterized by a further attenuation of
the right IPL and left dorsomedial thalamus in the beta band.
The implications of these results are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
NS ATTENUATION IS LINKED TO DECREASED mPFC CORTICAL
ACTIVITY AND DECREASED NEGATIVE EMOTIONS
As predicted, frontal, and especially medial prefrontal, high-
gamma-band decreases in oscillatory activity resulted from atten-
uating the narrative mode of processing toward a minimal
experiential mode (NS vs. MS, Figure 4). The link between
NS attenuation and reduced mPFC activity, is, as noted, sup-
ported by virtually all fMRI research and review studies regarding
self-referential processing (Gusnard et al., 2001; D’Argembeau
et al., 2005; Northoff et al., 2006; Christoff et al., 2011; Qin and
Northoff, 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011; Kim, 2012). Also,
as mentioned, intracranial EEG studies (Nir et al., 2007; Jerbi
et al., 2010; Ossandón et al., 2011; Ramot et al., 2012) correlate
self-referential and DMN blood-oxygenation-level-dependent
(BOLD) reductions to suppressed high gamma-band oscillatory
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Table 3 | MS vs. SL beamforming solutions for gamma (60–80Hz) and beta (13–25Hz).
Condition Cluster #
(number of
voxels)
Threshold
(t-Value)
Peak voxel (PSC) Hemisphere
overlap
Regions included in cluster
(atlas TT_Daemon)
TLRC coordinates (mm, RAI) PSC t-value
x y z Left (%) Right (%) Name Overlap (%)
M
S
vs
.S
L
(1
3–
25
H
z)
1 (182) 3.89* 2.5 −47.5 2.5 −0.0087 4.1 61.30 36.90 L/R Medial frontal gyrus 35.8
L/R Anterior cingulate 22.8
L Sup frontal gyrus 17.0
R Caudate 2.2
R Middle frontal gyrus 0.8
2 (109) 3.89* −37.5 37.5 47.5 −0.139 3.96 0.00 100.00 R Cingulate gyrus 24.9
R Precuneus 19.8
R Paracentral lobule 14.1
R Inf parietal lobule 5.2
R Postcentral gyrus 4.4
R Supramarginal gyrus 1.7
R Angular gyrus 0.5
3 (66) 3.89* 22.5 27.5 12.5 −0.093 4.1 94.00 2.00 L Thalamus 37.0
L Insula 6.7
L Lentiform nucleus 5.8
L Claustrum 2.4
4 (13) 3.89* −47.5 32.5 47.5 −0.14 4.19 0.00 98.50 R Inf parietal lobule 77.0
R Postcentral gyrus 21.7
5 (11) 3.89* 37.5 32.5 37.5 −0.089 4.02 100.00 0.00 L Inf parietal lobule 40.5
6 (9) 3.89* −42.5 2.5 47.5 −0.122 3.96 0.00 97.40 R Precentral gyrus 66.1
R middle frontal gyrus 33.9
M
S
vs
.S
L
(6
0–
80
H
z) No significant clusters
Information supplied includes number of voxels in each cluster, thresholds, peak voxel characteristics, hemispheric overlap, and brain regions included in the cluster.
The Afni supplied TT Daemon atlas was used. Due to poor resolution and signal leakage to non-brain regions, overlap percentages do not always add up to 100%.
*p < 0.0025 (corrected).
activity. As existing MEG studies of the self are either event-
related studies (Walla et al., 2007) or connectivity studies (Lou
et al., 2010b), the present study is the first to directly bridge fMRI
BOLD and frequency-dependent MEG power results in the con-
text of self-referential processing. The robust and extensive mPFC
decreased gamma-power in MS relative to NS provide further
evidence regarding the neural underpinning of the BOLD fMRI
results, but also, importantly, anchor the results acquired through
MEG to the main fMRI body of literature.
In addition to the reduced mPFC gamma oscillations, NS
attenuation was also marked by a dramatic reduction of negative
and mixed (both positive and negative) emotions: from 10 par-
ticipants reporting such emotions in NS to only 1 in MS and SL,
respectively. These are in alignment with findings directly asso-
ciating increased midline activity in DMN regions to self-related
emotionality (Northoff et al., 2009; Wiebking et al., 2011). As the
link between increased self-focus, mPFC activity, and mood and
anxiety disorders has been previously established (for reviews see
Ressler and Mayberg, 2007; Lemogne et al., 2012), the present
findings supports the notion that approaching self-experience
through a more present-centered focus may be critical to human
well-being (Davidson, 2004). A similar conclusion was reached by
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) who showed, based on a large-
scale web-based experience sampling survey, that a wandering
mind (dominating over 46% of waking experience) is less happy
than amind focused on what it is doing—regardless of the valence
of the activity being engaged.
MEDIAL AND LATERAL PARIETAL BETA-BAND OSCILLATORY ACTIVITY
MEDIATE MS PROCESSING
As mentioned, the MS network evidencing beta-band power
attenuation (MS vs. SL) included posterior medial and lateral
parietal regions (Figure 5), which were not part of the NS net-
work (in both beta and gamma). The IPL and right precuneus
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FIGURE 6 | Phenomenological categories and meditative expertise
chart. Participants (x-axis) are plotted as a function of meditative expertise
(y -axis) from least to most -experienced. The meditation experience
measure is a normalized (0–1) measure incorporating both years and hours
of meditation practice. Colors indicate phenomenological category of
participants’ SL description (blue = LO [Lack-of-ownership], green = AE
[Altered-experience], yellow = LH [Less-happening], white = unclear). Note
the increase in meditative expertise for the LO group (circled in red).
FIGURE 7 | LO source estimates. Sagittal and coronal views of significant
(∗p < 0.02, corrected) LO source estimates (n = 4) relative to the other
participants (n = 6, not including “unclear” category), overlayed on the
Colin template. Crosshairs are in (A) on the right IPL; and in (B) on the left
dorsomedial thalamus. The table provides Talairach coordinates, PSC, and
other cluster details.
have been found to be involved in the mediation of agency (Farrer
and Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Nahab et al., 2011), in differ-
entiating third- and first-person perspectives (Ruby and Decety,
2001; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004), and in self-
other discrimination (Uddin et al., 2006, 2007). The works of Olaf
Blanke and colleagues (reviewed in Blanke, 2012), summarizing
extensive neuroimaging and neurological data, highlight the role
of right-hemisphere-dominated lateral parietal regions inmediat-
ing the most basic aspects of self-consciousness. Damasio (1999,
2010) argues that medial parietal regions are specifically involved
in MS and not in NS (parallel to Damasio’s core and extended
selves, respectively). Laureys et al. (1999, 2004) show impaired
PCC, precuneus, parieto-temporal, and prefrontal function in
vegetative state patients, and suggest that it is the PCC/precuneus
that distinguishes vegetative from minimally conscious patients.
Using transcranial magnetic stimulation, Kwan et al. (2007) and
Luber et al. (2012) established a causal role for the mPFC, but
not the precuneus and right IPL in self-evaluation, while Lou
et al. (2010a) showed the causal role of the IPL but not the mPFC
in self-specific processes. Finally, Philippi et al. (2012) describe
a patient with preserved self-awareness, recognition and agency,
but an impaired autobiographical self, following extensive bilat-
eral damage to the insula, ACC and mPFC, with medial parietal
regions left intact. Together, and in line with the present findings,
a strong case can bemade for dissociating parietal from prefrontal
regions in regard to self-reference, linking the former with MS
processing.
Themain finding of the present study is the beta-band network
underlying MS processing, clearly dissociable in the frequency
domain from the well-documented gamma-frequency network
underlying NS. This finding is not surprising when consider-
ing the related literature. The basic awareness of self and others
has been most often studied within the context of the sense
of agency, with two main theories attempting to account for
it. The first of these is the classic or extended versions of the
“comparator model” or “central monitoring theory” (Frith, 1992;
Synofzik et al., 2008), which posit self-awareness to hinge on
to motor optimization and control networks. The second the-
ory is of action simulation or “mirror neurons” (reviewed in
Sinigaglia and Rizzolatti, 2011), which claims that attributing
actions to one’s self or to others hinges on our capacity to rep-
resent action as our own motor possibilities. What is shared by
both accounts is that they understand minimal self-awareness to
be embodied within, or mapped onto, motor systems. Numerous
studies in animals and humans, including MEG, implicate large-
scale beta band fronto-parietal oscillatory networks in sensori-
motor decision-making, motor planning, and motor detection
(reviewed in Siegel et al., 2012). While the sense of agency has not
yet been empirically tied to a specific frequency band, mirror neu-
ron effects have been shown to occur predominantly in the beta
band in MEG studies (Muthukumaraswamy and Singh, 2008).
Thus, as minimal self-awareness is theorized to hinge on motor-
related networks which manifest predominantly in the beta band,
the logical frequency band to host MS representations is, in fact,
the beta band.
MS AS AN EARLY PRE-REFLECTIVE PROCESS INHERENT TO NS
PROCESSING
As mentioned in the introduction, some form of self-specifying
minimal processing is in operation also during NS, accounting for
narrative representations experienced as our representations. The
pre-reflective nature of MS, and on the other hand, the reflective
nature of NS, suggest that when self-related stimuli appear, MS
processing will begin earlier than NS. While the present design
does not reveal the temporal unfolding of MS vs. NS process-
ing, there are a number of studies which may link the present
findings to the time domain. The EEG-LORETA language-based
(trait adjectives in reference to self, “I,” or a close friend, “he/she”)
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event-related study (Esslen et al., 2008) is particularly interest-
ing, as it not only distinguishes, in line with the present and other
findings (Zysset et al., 2003; Northoff et al., 2006; Schneider et al.,
2008), the dorsal and ventral mPFC as differentially involved in
reflective vs. pre-reflective self processing, but also determines
their activation time-course. In the pre-reflective self condition,
both the ventral mPFC and the insula were activated as early as
134–170ms post stimulus, while differential dorsal mPFC acti-
vation in self vs. other -reference was only found when averaging
over the whole time-course (700ms). These temporal distinctions
are upheld by a single MEG sensor-level study of self-awareness
found in the literature (Walla et al., 2007). This event-related
study, also language-based, examined encoding effects of the
German language equivalents of “a,” “his” and “mine,” assumed to
reflect different levels of self representation. The results indicated
early (200–400ms) and late (500–800ms) time window effects.
The 2D topography of the early time window reveals differential
activity in posterior central electrodes (and in a few prefrontal
ones), very similar to the 13–25Hz beta-band 2D scalp map
(Figure 3). Walla et al. interpret the early window effect as indi-
cating a stage when the perceptual object, here a word, has not
yet been branded as self/non-self, or in other words, a pre-MS
stage. In contrast, the 2D representation of the late time window
bears striking similarity to the 60–80Hz high-gamma 2D scalp
map presented in Figure 3 (frontal left activity). The similarity
between the 2D cortical maps of MS and the early window, and
NS and the later time window, together with the ventral vs. dorsal
mPFC differential activation which holds both in terms of tempo-
rality (early vs. late time windows) and in terms of self processing
mode (MS vs. NS), argue in favor ofMS reflecting an early process
inherent to the cognition of NS processing.
THE NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY OF MINDFULNESS-INDUCED
SELFLESSNESS
Phenomenology played a double role in the present study, guid-
ing both its design as well as data analysis. Regarding design,
this study was inspired by “front-loading phenomenological
insights into experimental design” (Gallagher and Sørensen,
2006). Specifically, and like other studies (Hasenkamp et al.,
2012), mindfulness was employed in the spirit expressed by Varela
et al. (1991) as a “. . . disciplined perspective on human experience
that can enlarge the domain of cognitive science to include direct
experience . . . ” (p. 33). Requesting long-term mindfulness prac-
titioners to produce in laboratory settings the state of SL allowed
a unique view of the neural correlates specific to the “mini-
mal” aspect of momentary experience, rendering these aspects of
human experience scientifically tractable (Lutz et al., 2007).
Regarding data analysis, collecting first-person descriptions of
the SL experience allowed grouping the data into three distinct
phenomenological categories (Table 1): AE descriptions indi-
cated an altered spatial/sensual perspective of self experience,
while LH descriptions indicated an attenuation of experience/r.
LO descriptions, on the other hand, produced by participants cul-
tured by a qualitatively greater meditation experience (Figure 6),
indicated an attenuation of the agentive/ownership aspects
accompanying experience. Despite the different phenomenolog-
ical descriptions, all of the participants reported similar high
rates of success and stability in all the tasks (including SL) rela-
tive to their past experiences (see section 3.1). This discrepancy
can be interpreted as indicating a diminished MS experience for
all participants, but diminished through different strategies and
accompanied by distinct phenomenological experiences. In par-
ticular, the more experienced LO group is interesting as their
descriptions indicate a specific subtraction of agency/ownership
from momentary experience. This distinct phenomenology was
then tied to a distinct neural signature: a further attenuation of
beta-band power (relative to the AE and LH groups) in the left
dorsomedial thalamus and right IPL (Figure 7).
Subcortical regions have only recently begun to be incorpo-
rated into theories of self-awareness (see Northoff and Panksepp,
2008; Damasio, 2010 and Christoff et al., 2011). The reported
suppressed beta power in the dorsomedial thalamus support these
researchers’ hypotheses regarding the crucial involvement of sub-
cortical circuits in the mediation of primal mammalian core
processes tagging phenomena as self/not-self, which then feed
into higher MS cortical representations. On the cortical level, the
right inferior parietal sulcus has been highlighted as a region inte-
grating multisensory bodily signals and reflecting the conscious
experience of being an “I,” a spatially localized entity correspond-
ing to first-person perspective and identity (Ionta et al., 2011;
Blanke, 2012). The IPL has also been hypothesized as a key region
responsible for the sense of agency and subjective sense of con-
trol (e.g., Farrer et al., 2008; Nahab et al., 2011; Haggard and
Chambon, 2012). Along with these studies, the present findings
support the role of this region in reflecting one of the most aston-
ishing features of the humanmind, the subjective “self as I” aspect
of conscious experience, and put forth the hypothesis—to be
examined by subsequent research—that it is mediated specifically
within the beta band.
STUDY LIMITATIONS
One limitation of the study concerns its unique participants. We
acknowledge a potential lack of generalizability to non-vipassana
and non-meditator general populations, in particular regarding
the state of SL, which is an experience cultured by meditation
practice and comprehensible from a Buddhist, but perhaps not
Western, point of view (but see Metzinger, 2003). Another lim-
itation regards the small sample of participants, especially in
the neurophenomenological analysis, which yielded very small
groups. Thus, the results reported here warrant replication in
a larger group and in other meditative traditions. In addition,
the reported phenomenological analysis is rudimentary in nature.
This is partly due to the experimental conditions of interview-
ing participants via intercom between tasks, but partly also to the
exploratory nature of the advent of translating phenomenological
insights of long-established contemplative traditions into current
neurocognitive terms. Future studies can build on these prelim-
inary results and develop more sophisticated phenomenological
characterizations of self and selfless modes of awareness using
more rigorous qualitative/phenomenological analysis methods.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The present study highlighted the role of frequency-dependent
networks, dissociable in the frequency domain but partially
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overlapping in brain topography, in supporting different modes
of self-processing. These results emphasize the unique contri-
bution of MEG to the neuroimaging self-awareness literature.
In addition, the present study illustrated the utility of combin-
ing first-person reports, neuroimaging, and Buddhist-inspired
mind training for scientifically characterizing selflessness. Indeed,
a non-trivial outcome of the present study is that long-term
mindfulness meditators are actually able, under experimental
conditions, to successfully produce and steadily hold a self-
less mode of awareness. This state of mind, which is alien
to normal non-pathological conscious experience and which
has not been previously scientifically documented and neu-
rocognitively mapped, allows a unique glance at the neural
underpinnings of the more subtle and basic processes of self-
awareness.
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